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Abstract
For some time now, queer theory has uncritically as-
sumed that identity politics should be rejected outright. 
Through a theoretical and biographical discussion of 
Michel Foucault’s resistance against the subject—his 
attempts at subject effacement—this paper argues that 
resistance is not realized through non-identity politics 
alone. It addresses two main questions: does the prac-
tice of non-identity sufficiently resist knowledge that 
(re)presents subjects and what are the social and polit-
ical possibilities or risks of subject effacement? In re-
sponse to these questions, it argues that, although the 
queer politics of non-identity is a mode of resistance, it 
is not sufficient as resistance in all contexts or fields of 
knowledge. It suggests that in many contexts, what Fou-
cault refers to as the “infinite possibility of self ” or the 
interruption of the subject cannot be realized through 
invisibility politics: in many contexts this possibility can 
only be experienced if and when the subject comes face 
to face with the presence of an other-subject. 
Résumé 
Depuis un certain temps, la théorie queer suppose de 
façon incontestée que les politiques d’identité  devraient 
être rejetées d’emblée. Par une discussion théorique et 
biographique de la résistance de Michel Foucault à ce 
sujet – ses tentatives d’effacement du sujet – cet article 
fait valoir que la résistance n’est pas atteinte par des 
politiques de non-identité seulement. L’article aborde 
deux principales questions  : est-ce que la pratique de 
la non-identité résiste suffisamment aux connaissances 
qui représentent les sujets, et quelles sont les possibilités 
sociales et politiques ou les risques de l’effacement du 
sujet? Pour répondre à ces questions, l’article fait valoir 
que bien que la politique queer de la non-identité est 
un mode de résistance, il ne s’agit pas d’une résistance 
suffisante dans tous les contextes ou les domaines de 
connaissance. L’article suggère que dans de nombreux 
contextes, ce que Foucault appelle la « possibilité 
infinie de l’être » ou l’interruption du sujet ne peut pas 
être atteinte par des politiques d’invisibilité; dans de 
nombreux contextes, le sujet peut uniquement faire 
l’expérience de cette possibilité s’il se retrouve face à face 
avec la présence d’un autre sujet.
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“Between the affirmation, ‘I am a homosexual,’ and the re-
fusal to say this, there lies a highly ambiguous dialectic,” 
Foucault remarked in a 1982 interview, scarcely veiling his 
exasperation over the unrelenting pressure to take a stand. 
“It is a necessary affirmation of a right, but at the same 
time a cage, a trap” (Miller 1993, 256).1
Identity politics, both a symptom of and a response to 
these networks of control capitulates once again to chas-
ing the space of retribution for the subject. Control masks 
itself, or masks its effects, within the endless drive to re-
coup the resistant subject. We must instead advocate that 
resistance give way to delinquency (Puar 2007, 162). 
 Just like Michel Foucault, queer theory has al-
ways regarded identity with deep suspicion and it up-
holds this aversion as an antidote that redresses the 
constraints posed by the subject, ones that various fem-
inist, critical race, and lesbian and gay identity politics 
are said to leave intact (Ryan 2001, 325-326; Ford 2007, 
479-482).2 Queer theory enlists Foucault’s politics of 
non-identity, and variations thereof, to ferret out and 
undo the limits of the subject so that you might “cease 
to be imprisoned in your own face, in your own past, 
in your own identity” (Miller 1993, 264). The distrust 
of identity that drives queer theory is so ingrained that 
it often turns its suspicion back in on itself in that even 
“queer anti-identity narratives” are now located, for 
instance by Jasbir Puar (2007), on the same “continu-
um that privileges the pole of identity as the evolved 
form of Western modernity” (222). Queer practices of 
non-identity, it turns out, are just as vulnerable to (re)
presenting the subject through homonationalist re-ter-
ritorializations that institute queer non-identity as an 
identity politic after all.3 Turned back on itself, queer 
theory’s mistrust of identity politics has lead it to take 
up the politics of assemblage and to pursue identity’s 
collapse: with a “cacophony of informational flows, en-
ergetic intensities, bodies, and practices that undermine 
coherent identity and even queer anti-identity narra-
tives” (222), “to conceive the pure experience, event and 
dramatization of many sexes without falling back onto 
the ontological constitution of queer sexuality” (Pari-
si 2009, 72), by “opening up to the fantastical wonders 
of futurity” and affect to resist forces that rationalize 
identities into finite and narrow existence (Puar 2007, 
222), and to evade “singularity” in favour of “collectiv-
ity, imagination and a kind of situationist commitment 
to surprise and shock” (Halberstam 2011, 29).4 As a re-
sult, queer Deluezean approaches also demonstrate the 
deep suspicion of identity that reverberates throughout 
queer theory and Foucauldian approaches; as Chrysan-
thi Nigianni and Merl Storr (2009) explain, Deleuzean 
approaches set out to “queer the queer” by circumvent-
ing the question of (non-)identity, because they are “not 
just against this or that particular identity as not being 
politically useful, but against the very concept of identi-
ty and the thinking it engenders” (5).5
 Where queer theory more recently engages Gilles 
Delueze to undercut the influence of Foucault’s politics 
of non-identity, as an identity politic, the similarity of 
purpose to which both philosophers have been put is 
uncanny, because it was always with “flows,” “intensi-
ties,” “bodies,” “practices,” and new “pleasures,” or affect, 
that queer theories set out, originally with Foucault, to 
disrupt the trap of identity. To this extent, the suspicion 
of identity with which queer theory, like a reflex, turns 
on itself again and again, must also demand, if it hasn’t 
already, this inevitable conclusion: the queer politics of 
assemblage recreates the same problems of (non-)iden-
tity that Deleuze is used to dodge, for instance, via the 
claim that queer non-identity is penetrated by the pole 
of identity. 
 To illustrate, consider for a moment that the op-
position of queer assemblages against queer non-identi-
ty to reduce the latter to identity politics, by virtue of be-
ing a non-identity politics, really is a (queer) critique to 
which assemblage is susceptible too. Queer assemblage 
politics sets out to “escape[s] the traditional strategy of 
negation (queer as the non-, anti-, contra-)” and thereby 
avert the binary thought it locates in queer non-identity 
politics; it claims to do so because it avoids questions of 
(non-)identity altogether (Nigianni and Storr 2009, 2). 
This is the appeal of Deleuzian approaches to queer the-
ory: they appear to avoid the binary thinking that an-
ti-identity politics, as such, find unavoidable. The logic 
behind a queer move to avoidance, Margaret Shildrick 
(2009) explains, is that it is only when “queer theory ex-
plicitly intervenes in the parameters of social exclusion,” 
for instance, as anti-identity politics must, that queer 
theory “to an extent must always reiterate binary think-
ing in order to contest it” (129; emphasis added).6 
 However, the strategic avoidance of identity can 
be exposed as just as much of a negation as any explicit 
rejection of identity because queer theorists, like my-
self, are groomed from the outset to be on the lookout 
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for identity everywhere; the only difference between the 
two is that an avoidance is a covert mode of rejection 
that is implicit, subterranean, and passive—like centers 
and margins, the explicit and implicit are extant co-op-
eratives in negation, even if they “cannot be naturalised 
as ‘having always existed’” (Deleuze qtd. in Conley 
2009, 26). So regardless of the opacity of its anti-identity 
strategy, queer assemblage politics can also be placed on 
a continuum with queer non-identity politics; it is just 
as buggered by the pole of identity if and when queer 
theory renders it suspect, as I have here. Moreover, as 
long as the suspicion of identity is allowed to remain 
totalizing in queer theory, queer theory is going to eat 
its tail. All of which causes me to say that queer theory 
really needs to ask a different question: is identity pre-
cisely the problem that faces queer theory or is it the 
rejection of identity, as queer reflex, that poses today’s 
greatest threat to queers? 
 This paper responds to what I think is the large-
ly uncritical belief that operates implicitly and explicit-
ly throughout queer theory: it is the belief that identity 
politics must always be rejected. As Hiram Perez (2005) 
observes, “a great deal of queer theorizing has sought 
to displace identity politics with an alternative an-
ti-identitarian model,” one he also challenges, because 
it conflates queerness uncritically and too often with 
a “race-neutral objectivity” (172). The central claim in 
this paper is that queer theory’s totalizing rejection of 
identity is socially and politically incautious; and since 
queer praxes of non-identity and assemblage are on a 
continuum in that both are suspicious of identity pol-
itics, this essay makes no attempt to differentiate be-
tween them—they are equally anti-identitarian.7 It ar-
gues that it is a mistake to think that either identity or 
anti-identity politics, solely, is fitting in every context 
that demands a social-political response. It also demon-
strates that a balance must be struck between identity 
politics and queer politics that intends to interrupt the 
subject and visibility politics. 
 In Post-Queer Politics, David Ruffolo (2009) 
remarks that “[t]he relationship between queer (theo-
ry) and Foucault is clearly immense” and arguably his 
influence is rivaled only by Judith Butler, whose own 
works are profoundly indebted nonetheless to Foucault 
(8). He is “the founding father of contemporary queer 
theory” and, as such, I return to his life, work, and prac-
tices as origins of queer theory’s suspicion of identity, 
even as Foucault died prior to the treatment of his theo-
ries as queer (Cohen and Ramlow 2005/2006).8 Indeed, 
Foucault’s use of the term “homosexual” is like that be-
hind “queer”; he used the former to signal a politics of 
non-identity in the face of a “gay” (and primarily white) 
identity politics, and this is why the terms “homosexual’ 
and “queer” are used one for another herein. It is also 
worth mentioning that “it is precisely in [his] refusal to 
see alternative sexual pleasures as repressive that Fou-
cault prefigures the queering of desire that is associated 
with Deleuze” in queer theory today (Shildrick 2004, 
n.p.). As we will see, Foucault’s refusal—which initiated 
queer theory in praxes of flows, intensities, and bod-
ies—culminated out of his interest in “what bodies can 
do, in how they are productive, rather than in how they 
respond to unconscious impulses, and in how the erotic 
can be redistributed to non-genital sites.” (n.p.)
 Through a philosophical analysis of Foucault’s 
biography and theories, this paper treats Foucault as an 
occasion to demonstrate the social and political failures 
of queer and absolutist rejections of identity or visibility 
politics.9 It critically examines his resistance to identity 
and his attempts to efface the discursive effects of pow-
er/knowledge that give rise to the subject as the limited 
and over-determined foundation for identity or identi-
fication. It reconsiders his sexual non-identity to show 
that queer practices of non-identity, on their own, are 
insufficient to resist the effects of heteronormativity and 
homonormativity; although queer praxes of non-iden-
tity are a mode of resistance, these praxes alone cannot 
enliven resistance in all contexts or fields of knowledge. 
It concludes that, in many contexts, resistance demands 
self-encounters with identity or other-subjects and not 
self-effacement. 
 The problems of identity that Foucault’s theories 
resist are manifest in the history of identity politics; the 
brief history of identity politics that follows clarifies two 
key reasons it is rejected by contemporary queer the-
ory, as well as feminist postructural and postcolonial 
theory.10 Identity politics is the idea that one’s person-
al identity—as a person of colour, gay, lesbian, bisex-
ual, disabled, Indigenous, or trans person—is the best 
basis for politics and action (Fuss 1989, 97). It became 
strongly influential in the late 1970s and early 80s, when 
U.S. Black lesbian feminists and, notably, the Comba-
hee River Collective argued that “focusing upon our 
own oppression is embodied in the concept of identity 
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politics” and that “the most profound and potentially 
radical politics come directly out of our own identity” 
(Combahee River Collective 1982, 16). José Esteban 
Muñoz (1999) notes that “the idea of a radical feminist 
of color identity that shrewdly reconfigures identity for 
a progressive political agenda” was also developed by 
Chicana lesbian feminists Gloria Anzaldúa and Cherríe 
Moraga in the famous anthology, This Bridge Called My 
Back: Writings by Radical Women of Colour (7). Identity 
politics, as Moraga proposed, meant that feminists must 
also address the implications of their own identities as 
both “oppressed” and “oppressor” (Fuss 1989, 99). It 
was also a radical response to the internal climates of 
Black nationalist and white feminist politics, climates il-
lustrated by the powerful title All the Women are White, 
All the Blacks are Men, But Some of Us are Brave, anoth-
er pivotal anthology edited by Gloria T. Hull, Patricia 
Bell Scott, and Barbara Smith.11
 Given its origins in the politics of sex, race, class, 
and sexuality, identity politics did not remain solely a 
Black and Chicana lesbian feminist project. It was em-
braced by critical race theory, which developed in the 
U.S. in the 1970s out of a convergence of critical legal 
studies, (Black) radical feminisms, the radical politics of 
the civil rights movement, and the continental philos-
ophies of “Antonio Gramsci, Michel Foucault, and 
Jacques Derrida” (Delgado and Stefancic 2012, 4-5).12 
Identity politics also influenced the broader North 
American lesbian and gay movement, which promoted 
a politics of “gay activism; ‘gay pride,’ ‘gay culture,’ ‘gay 
sensibility’” to form the “cornerstones of the gay com-
munity” and liberate “a long-repressed collective iden-
tity” (Fuss 1989, 97). 
 In the 1980s and 90s, identity politics was chal-
lenged by poststructural and postcolonial feminism(s), 
developments in critical race theory, and queer theory 
as it emerged from lesbian and gay studies, for two main 
reasons.13 The first is that identity politics is said to de-
volve into essentialism because it assumes “[t]he link 
between identity and politics is causally and teleologi-
cally defined” or that “identity necessarily determines a 
particular kind of politics” (Fuss 1989, 99). The second 
is that it is said to undermine “the task of constructing 
a tradition of unity between various groups,” because 
different identities and oppressions call for differentiat-
ed, not joint or universal, political strategies and goals 
(Harris 1999, 314). Moreover, identity politics became 
suspect within poststructuralist and postcolonial fem-
inisms and queer theories because these theories reject 
the idea of a stable, cohesive, or fixed identity; each pro-
poses an arbitrary, limited, and determined discursive 
subject, a notion popularized by the transcontinental 
reach and interdisciplinary resonance of Michel Fou-
cault’s works.14 Although central to critical race theory, 
by the 1990s, identity politics also met with challeng-
es here, too, challenges such as the “collapsing myth 
of ‘brown-black solidarity’” and “[t]he tragedy…that 
too little is done either by African American or Latino 
‘mainstream’ leaders who practice racial identity poli-
tics to transcend their parochialism and to refine their 
agendas on common ground” (Marable 2000, 448, 450). 
For instance, critical race identity politics was taken 
“to task for being too focused on the ‘black-white par-
adigm’ and for failing to deal with the relationship be-
tween race and sexuality” (Harris 1999, 314). Feminist 
and queer critical race and LaCrit theorists, such as An-
gela P. Harris and Francisco Valdes, argued a “‘race-first 
principle’” sidelines the concerns of racialized women 
and queers (314).15 In this light, identity politics was a 
threat to unified political movement.16 While identity 
politics has been exhaustively critiqued, for these and 
other reasons (e.g., ones related to epistemology), its 
primary association with the finitude of essentialism 
and social and political immobilization is at the heart of 
Foucault’s rejection of visibility politics. 
 In a BBC documentary, Michel Foucault: Beyond 
Good and Evil (1993), Foucault’s positioning of himself 
in relation to San Francisco’s “gay” community is re-
counted: “There are so many gays, and I am a homo-
sexual.” But Foucault was not asserting a “homosexual” 
identity. He was disassociating himself from the fixed 
terms and politics of “gay” identity, a strategy that set 
the stage for a queer politics of non-identity.17 Just as 
queers today reject identity, Foucault resisted the asso-
ciation of his sexual practices with a name because it 
undermines the infinite possibility of self; his “misgiv-
ings … around the public assertion of a putative sexual 
identity” belie his interest in subject effacement as resis-
tance (Leo Bersani qtd. in Miller 1993, 254). 
 Effacement occurs if the self exceeds the sub-
ject (i.e., the known self as an ontological formation 
that is constituted by the limits of meaning and the bri-
dled experiences these limits produce). It is a perpetual 
self-practice that undermines the advancement of the 
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“injustice proper to the will to knowledge” (Foucault 
1984, 97). It turns on Foucault’s notion of the subject; 
the subject is “a sort of mirage in which we think we see 
ourselves reflected” and it forms the basis for identifi-
cation (Foucault 1980, 157). It emerges from historical 
and contemporary modes of knowledge that associate 
particular truths or meanings with, among other things, 
human being, or the self, as mind, body, and experience; 
and these truths, although arbitrary, operate as though 
they are natural. The subject is a history of the human 
will to know the self: it is a manifestation of a “will to 
knowledge,” a knowledge that is arbitrary because it is 
willed at all (12-13). The subject (i.e., as self-mediated 
by such a will) poses human being in ways that render it 
knowable or intelligible. In relation to identity, the sub-
ject is the set of discursive forces that precede what can 
be made of any identity; it is like a plinth upon which 
identity is founded or a discursive accumulation out of 
which identity is forged (Miller 1993, 41, 48, 49).18 The 
subject is the limit imposed on the possibility of identity 
and, thus, it is a limit on identity as resistance. As a re-
sult, Foucault’s aim in subject-effacement is a rejection 
of identity, even as “the subject” and not “identity” is the 
focus of so much of his work. 
 Foucault’s notion of the subject and its relation-
ship to identity is clarified by Judith Butler (1990) in 
Gender Trouble: “Foucault points out that juridical sys-
tems of power produce the subjects they subsequently 
come to represent” (2). In a discussion of Butler’s ap-
plication of Foucault to questions of gender identity, 
Brady and Schirato (2011) further explain that if one 
is “to have, gain, claim or be assigned an identity, one 
must be recognizable and explicable within a particu-
lar grid of intelligibility that makes subjects appear and 
authorizes the subject’s status as an identity-in-waiting” 
(6). The subject, therefore, is the discursive genera, if 
you will, that makes identity possible. As Foucault 
(1980) illustrates in The History of Sexuality, the homo-
sexual subject is the prelude to homosexual identity—it 
makes this mode of identification possible as an effect 
of the proliferation of nineteenth and twentieth century 
medical and psychiatric sexual discourse, which newly 
named certain sexual practices “homosexual.” The sub-
ject is at the heart of the problem of identity as resistance 
for Foucault (and Butler); identity, as an offspring of the 
subject, is always already implicated in the processes of 
subjection that shape it and, therefore, it cannot resist 
the juridical forces out of which it is formed. 
 Identity and its politics are dangerous. While the 
self exercises some choice with regard to identification, 
choices between possible subject positions do not entail 
more or less constraint. This idea underpins Foucault’s 
refusals to identify at all; choices between, rather than 
refusals of, identities impose a constraining “visibili-
ty” on the self (Miller 1993, 53).19 Foucault intends to 
thwart the trap of being known. This is also at the heart 
of his notion of subject effacement, which is an ontolog-
ical resistance against the knowledge that conceals the 
self ’s infinite possibility of being; to say “I am” limits or 
constrains the self ’s and the other’s sense of the self, so 
that the self is only ever encountered as a subject—it is 
an exercise of the self ’s will to know (i.e., construct) it-
self as a subject. For Foucault (1984), “gay” or any other 
identity politics enlists the self in a “progressive enslave-
ment,” the only escape from which entails “risking the 
destruction of the subject who seeks knowledge in the 
endless deployment of the will to knowledge” (97). 
 A will to knowledge manifests in, among other 
things, moments and durations in which the self active-
ly knows (i.e., identifies) itself and others as subjects. 
It is deployed as and through interdependent modes 
of knowledge, such as reason, science, psychology, and 
medicine, which conjoin “the analyzable body to the 
manipulable body” (Foucault 1979, 136). Subjects, as 
analyzed and known bodies, are selves manipulated by 
modes of knowledge that are deployed in a given social, 
political, and historical context, often, but not solely, 
through processes of identification. To impede this ma-
nipulation, Foucault proposes the subject’s destruction, 
in part through refusals of identity, which enables the 
self to interrupt its subjection from within, without, and 
wherever knowledge is deployed as identity. 
 Subject effacement is momentary, “limited and 
determined” (Miller 1993, 283). It is that which allows 
the self to resituate itself in relation to a will to knowl-
edge that constrains it as an identifiable subject.20 To 
thwart a will to knowledge and retain a view onto its 
other possibilities as human being, the self must active-
ly and repeatedly oppose the subject. To contradict the 
will to be a subject advances the self toward a fleeting, 
but nevertheless, powerful ontological possibility that 
human beings cannot experience as subjects or through 
identity politics. The only resistance against knowledge 
is a repeated undoing of the subject through attempts, 
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not to transcend, but to overspill the knowledge of the 
subject, albeit with a new will to knowledge that, until 
resisted, subjects the self to new constraints.21
 Foucault’s refusal to assert “I am ‘gay’” was an 
exercise in subject effacement and it initiated queer 
praxes of non-identity. The philosophical significance 
of Foucault’s fascination not with gay culture or iden-
tity, but with experiences of sex, sadomasochism, and 
drugs within a context known as “gay” is evident in his 
comments about San Francisco bathhouses:
“It is regrettable that such places for erotic ex-
perience”—for limitless anonymous encoun-
ters—“do not yet exist for heterosexuals … For 
would it not in effect be marvelous to have the 
power, at any hour of the day or night, to enter a 
place equipped with all the comforts and all the 
possibilities that one might imagine, and to meet 
there a body at once tangible and fugitive? There 
is an exceptional possibility in this context to 
desubjectify oneself, to desubjugate oneself,” to 
“desexualize oneself ” by affirming a “non-iden-
tity” through “a kind of plunge beneath the wa-
ter sufficiently prolonged that one returns from 
it with none of this appetite, with none of this 
torment one still feels even after satisfying sexual 
relationships” (Miller 1993, 264). 
Foucault’s (1989) point is that subjugating knowledges 
can be averted when we “make ourselves infinitely more 
susceptible to pleasure,” but not when we “liberate our 
desires” by invoking a right and, thereby, an identity 
(206). In an interview, Foucault suggests “the S&M phe-
nomenon” entails a notable “effect of intensifying sexual 
relations by introducing a perpetual novelty, a perpetual 
tension and a perpetual uncertainty” (226). It allows for 
desubjectification insofar as it blurs the lines between 
known pains and pleasures; it introduces the self to its 
potential to transform known experiences of pain into 
pleasure; and it allows the self to experience the possi-
bility of extracting itself from the subject position that 
constrains it through the body’s prior knowledge of 
pain. 
 Foucault (1979) investigates the “docile” body as 
an effect of “[d]iscipline organizing an analytical space” 
and the ways knowledge is employed so that “one may 
have a hold over others’ bodies” (143, 138). The com-
panion piece to his idea that a hold over others’ bodies 
may be had is that a hold over one’s own body can be 
had (i.e., knowledge is practiced upon the body from 
without and within). Where the self participates in the 
hold over the body as subject, Foucault understands it 
to deploy knowledge against itself. He also thinks the 
recognition of its role in this process affords the self an 
opportunity to resist that knowledge. This idea informs 
Foucault’s intrigue with gay S&M contexts and drugs, as 
opposed to gay identities, as opportunities for subject 
effacement: to pursue an infinite possibility of pleasures 
enlists the body or sense experience against the subject 
(i.e., finite knowledge)—it temporarily loosens the sub-
ject’s hold of the self via the body. 
 Foucault regarded “the human organism [to be] 
an intrinsically formless flux of impulses and energies” 
until it is contoured by a knowledge of “feelings” (Miller 
1993, 273). The subject is deployed when the self and 
others exercise power/knowledge upon the self; the 
body’s senses are ordered by discursive power, which 
gives rise to the meanings of sensation. Where subjects 
know sense experiences mutually, they do not do so es-
sentially; when two bodies experience sensation to be 
the same, it only indicates a subject position is shared. 
Where subjects share consensus on a sensation’s mean-
ing, sensation also maintains the subject; the self-be-
coming subject knows what it feels in relation to what 
similar subjects know as sensations of pain or pleasure. 
This is why a continual attempt to disrupt known feel-
ings with unknown or marginal feelings is a (momen-
tary) mode of resistance.22 Still, even when consensus 
on a sensation’s meaning is lacking, knowledge remains 
at work on the body because a feeling experienced is in-
creasingly known or subjugated as it is re-experienced. 
The subject is resisted if and when the self makes itself 
susceptible to “infinitely new” sensations and thoughts, 
but not if it remains susceptible to only the same sensa-
tions and thoughts, be they marginal or dominant. 
 Foucault’s resistance against “coming out” and 
“gay” identity endeavoured to realize his possibilities 
for infinite susceptibilities that might destroy “gay” and 
“straight” subjects. And while he did think coming out 
allowed the self to reclaim and modify the meanings by 
which it was marginalized and pathologized, he also 
thought it merely replaced one subject with a new one 
that is no less fixed or trapped. This is why Foucault re-
gards historical and on-going demands for gay and les-
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bian recognition and rights as beside the point: “I am 
‘gay’” merely (re)institutes the self within mechanisms 
of power and subjectivity that the assertion intends 
to resist.23 So, although defiant “gay” assertions might 
transform power (e.g., as a refusal of shame or demand 
for rights), Foucault still thought the self that consents 
to be a (marginal) “gay” subject is dominated by what 
becomes merely a “gay” mode of power/knowledge. To 
be “gay,” therefore, is as dangerous as being “heterosex-
ual,” because gay identity acts only as a new disciplinary 
knowledge, a critical point that likely predicts Lisa Dug-
gan and Jasbir Puar’s respective notions of “homonor-
mative” and “homonationalist” subjectivity (Duggan 
2003, 50; Puar 2007, 4).24 
 The rejection of “gay” identity and his intrigue 
with sadomasochistic, male-to-male sexual practice are 
facets of Foucault’s philosophical “search for styles of 
existence [that are] as different as possible from each 
other” (Foucault 1989, 330). His idea of styles aims at 
the de-subjectification and de-sexualization of the self 
and body that, as a subject, achieves “only one of the 
given possibilities of organizing a consciousness of self ” 
(330). Although he affirms the search for different styles 
of existence, he also assumes that each style is befall-
en by subjects because human being repeatedly fails 
to “think that what exists is far from filling all possible 
spaces” (209). Where Foucault rejects “gay” identity, he 
refuses a style already befallen by subjection, a move 
that informs contemporary, anti-identitarian queer pol-
itics: these refusals and style searches are signaled today 
by queer, wherein, queer theory “describes a horizon 
of possibility whose precise extent and heterogeneous 
scope cannot in principle be delimited in advance” 
(Halperin 1995, 62). Thus, Foucault accomplishes for 
queer theory the “informational flows, energetic inten-
sities, bodies, and practices that undermine coherent 
identity,” as well as the “[o]pening up to the fantastical 
wonders of futurity” (Puar 2007, 222) that Puar claims 
queer theory, as a non-identity politic, has historical-
ly failed to do. Ironically, the striking parallels between 
Foucauldian approaches and Deleuzean approaches like 
Puar’s to queer theory is that both are open to the same 
critique: a totalizing rejection of identity politics is a 
recipe for theory, not the world, because the subject is as 
likely to be reinforced as resisted if flows and futurities 
are the central aim of queer theory and politics.25 
 Consider Foucault’s practices against identi-
ty. He returned repeatedly to gay S&M spaces, in part 
to practice different styles of existence, to experience 
the infinite possibility of self, and/or to resist his own 
subjection. But, it is precisely the return that creates a 
problem for queer theory’s rejection of identity politics. 
Foucault never identified as “gay” or “straight.” He also 
intended to depart the field of heterosexual subjectivi-
ty through a return to gay spaces. By virtue of his own 
perspective, however, returns will not enable the self 
to repeatedly discover different as possible lifestyles, at 
least, not for very long. To seasoned “gay,” “lesbian,” “bi-
sexual,” “trans,” and queer people, the marginal spaces 
they frequent are normal, and increasingly so with each 
return; in contrast, “heterosexual” and perhaps mixed 
spaces, precisely because they continue to be alienat-
ing, are as different as possible. This does not mean the 
de-subjectifying destiny of gays, lesbians, bisexual, trans 
people, and queers should lie in a return to heterosex-
ual practice and contexts (although it could). It means 
returns to such spaces, in conjunction with a non-iden-
tity, function no more or less as resistance against con-
straining identities that are “gay” or “heterosexual.”
 Foucault’s returns, therefore, might only signal 
that he could not disassociate himself, for any duration, 
from the heterosexual context in which he lived more 
or at least as much of his life as an intellectual. In ad-
dition, his return to gay spaces, in light of his desire, 
might not enact different as possible styles of existence; 
it might only reflect an increasing bodily knowledge of 
(or subjection to) being “gay.” While Foucault would re-
ject his biography being used as a principle that unifies 
him with his works, the focus on facts, such as his razor 
blade exploits, his lack of heterosexual practice, his in-
terest in de Sade, his practice in the French homosexual 
“underground fraternity” prior to “gay” liberation, his 
time spent in North American, gay, S&M communities, 
and all that he wrote or said about these experiences, 
does not in fact solely and simply reduce his biogra-
phy to a unifying principle (Foucault 1984, 111; Eribon 
1991, 26; Miller 1993, 53, 45, 56, 254).26 It also reflects 
a history that inscribed his body with a knowledge. His 
biography of returns suggests his desire was practiced 
entirely in white, male, gay, and S&M contexts, which 
raises the question of whether or not the return to this 
or any site makes the self “infinitely more susceptible” 
to its possibility or infinitely more inscribed in the plea-
sures it knows. This question has implications for the 
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scope of Foucault’s non-identity politics as a queer poli-
tics that serves up resistance across varied contexts and 
times.
 Given his fascination with askesis—“the work 
that one performs on oneself in order to transform one-
self or make the self appear that happily one never at-
tains”—perhaps Foucault’s S&M practice of pleasure in 
pain was a work toward an unattainable self (Foucault 
1989, 206). Indeed, his returns might have facilitated a 
progression one-way along a continuum in a happily 
unanswered search for self (206). So why do Foucault 
and queer theorists who practice his ideas not propose 
askesis (i.e., the unattainable recreation of self through 
its infinite susceptibility) as resistance within a variety 
of marginalized contexts, rather than the same queer 
contexts? 
 Foucault died in 1984, and he only spoke of his 
sexual and S&M practice in his latter years, sometimes 
anonymously, usually in interviews with the gay press, 
and always in the third person. This implies he had an 
association with, even if he did not directly link his 
body to, gay practices. Conversely, his refusals to identi-
fy also imply a certain subjection to heterosexuality as a 
context in which he lived as a popular French “intellec-
tual” and from which he did not want to be excluded as 
a “gay” man (Miller 1993, 256). Yet, as Foucault brought 
gay practice into public view and implicated himself in 
these practices, he did not entirely fear the repercus-
sions of being associated with the gay community.27 Still, 
to the extent that he admittedly was an “intellectual,” 
he also preferred to be a gay affiliate whose ties could 
be cut, because “an intellectual, for [Foucault], is a guy 
hooked into the system of information” who is “able 
to make himself heard” (Eribon 1991, 253). Moreover, 
Foucault was insistent that his work not be “taken as 
talk about a potentially sequesterable minority,” a pos-
sibility that illuminates his double-edged observation 
regarding the danger of identity as “the necessary affir-
mation of a right, but at the same time a cage, a trap” 
(Miller 1993, 256). All of which is to say that the queer 
practice of Foucault’s non-identity politics can reinforce 
the subject even as it may intend to interrupt it: insofar 
as a non-identity leaves unidentifiable remains, it fails 
to resist the (heterosexual) subject in important ways. 
 A uniform application of non-identity across 
contexts, as Foucault and queer theory propose, is as 
dangerous as it is productive because it undermines the 
subject in some contexts, but not in all. Foucault (1989) 
imagined gay S&M spaces to be the contemporary “his-
toric occasion to re-open affective and relational virtu-
alities,” or as a site to pursue subject effacement (207). 
But does the affirmation of sexual practices over sexual 
identities really undermine as much as it reiterates the 
extant meanings of sexual excess that heteronorma-
tivity has already set up as the essence of gay, lesbian, 
trans, and queer identity? For instance, a heterosexu-
al acquaintance loves queer spaces because in them 
she experiences a sexual freedom she does not in het-
eronormative contexts. The question is why? One an-
swer is that heterosexuals often perceive gay, lesbian, 
trans, and queer spaces to have no or few rules, which 
leaves one sexually free to do as they choose. Neverthe-
less, queer space does have rules: “its own norms, and 
its own ways of keeping people in line” (Warner 1999, 
35). Heterosexuals who are not queer, or queer enough, 
therefore, are often suspect, even unwelcome, in these 
spaces whether they realize it or not. Even more signif-
icant is the fact that my acquaintance practices the pos-
sibility of being sexually free solely in queer spaces; she 
does not practice in contexts that would elicit a genuine 
resistance against the direct constraints her body knows 
within heteronormative contexts. In other words, if and 
when one does not practice (heterosexual) subject-ef-
facement in heterosexual contexts, or at the source of 
heterosexual subjectivity, does one meaningfully resist 
heteronormativity? The experience of sexual freedom 
that queer space offers is impractical as resistance if, in 
heterosexual contexts, one continues to be unable to 
stop the domination and circumscription of desire by 
a collective consciousness that is “heterosexual.” Argu-
ably, a fuller experience of the infinite possibility of be-
ing should entail a willingness to practice sexual resis-
tance in heterosexual contexts, at least as much as in 
queer ones.
 This is a central problem with the sexual pol-
itics of non-identity. In heterosexual contexts, the 
non-identity of the self whose practice, as opposed to 
identity, is queer is really a comfort to heterosexuals 
because invisible queer beings leave heteronormativity 
uninterrupted in the places it is most in need of resis-
tance.
 Conversely, the heterosexual subject is inter-
rupted when heterosexuals are forced to acknowledge 
the possibility of contrary knowledge that is reflected 
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by overt claims of queer identity, even as queer is pur-
ported not to be an identity. The “gay,” “lesbian,” “trans,” 
or “queer” identified subject, even if s/he is such mo-
mentarily or strategically, is a powerful strategy against 
heteronormativity; the political possibility of this kind 
of interruption, versus the practice of non-identity, is 
that it resists the self ’s and others’ subject positions.28 
So, although queer practice may disrupt the self ’s sub-
ject, which is valuable as one kind of resistance, it does 
not disrupt other subjects. For instance, when “gay,” 
“lesbian,” “trans,” or “queer” identities are consistently 
refused, while practices are not, the normative hetero-
sexual subject remains intact because, apart from en-
countering other sexual identities, this subject is just less 
likely to find itself in sexual contexts that elicit queer 
and contrary sexual knowledges. The self may disrupt 
its own subjectivity by means of non-identity, but its 
ability to disrupt the other’s subjectivity demands that it 
face the other as an other-subject or other-knowledge.
 The idea that gay or queer contexts stimulate 
de-subjectifying experiences solely through practice, 
as opposed to practice and identity, creates other prob-
lems. For instance, the politics of non-identity does not 
encourage heterosexual subjects to initiate an infinitely 
different or effectively de-subjectifying resistance at all. 
To reject a “queer” subject in favour of queer practice 
undercuts the “queer” subject’s possibility as an impetus 
that inspires heterosexual subjects to resist hetero-dom-
ination. More often than not, heterosexual subjects ap-
pear in heterosexual contexts, both by choice and be-
cause their heterosexual subject positions locate them 
outside the queer contexts in which the possibility of 
self-effacement is supposed to occur. As a result, queer 
practice offers heterosexuals little to no opportunity for 
effacement because heterosexuals practice heterosexu-
ality in heterosexual contexts. This lack of opportunity 
is compounded further by the earlier observation that 
heterosexuals, as such, are not generally welcome in 
queer contexts; queers mainly accept heterosexuals who 
are willing to efface their subjects, but only if that efface-
ment is a step toward repetitively queer practices that, 
let’s face it, are read and policed as “queer” identity.29 In-
sofar as queers that invoke Foucault’s theories locate the 
possibility of effacement in queer practice, heterosexual 
subjects who do not, or cannot, practice within these 
contexts are either discouraged or absolved from pursu-
ing the social and political aims of subject effacement.
 Unidentified queers render invisible the pos-
sibilities that are queer. As unknown possibilities, un-
identified queers reinforce, rather than interrupt, the 
boundaries of heterosexuality. Moreover, as heterosex-
uality operates outside as much or more than it does 
inside queer spaces, a consistent refusal to identify as 
“queer” is a lost opportunity to resist heterosexuality 
within its own fields of operation; in contexts that are 
not queer, heterosexual subjectivity is presumed in the 
absence of some other identification. Therefore, if queer 
practice does not exceed queer contexts and the self re-
fuses to be “gay,” “lesbian,” “bisexual,” “trans,” or “queer” 
in heterosexual contexts, heterosexuality simply knows 
no resistance. Obviously, the enactment of queer prac-
tices in heterosexual spaces (e.g., S&M or fisting in the 
boardroom) is as impractical as it politically danger-
ous, but this is just another reason the affirmation of 
identity is more effective as resistance in so many con-
texts.
 Foucault and, all too often, queer theory treats 
the politics of non-identity as uniformly accessible, an 
uncritical assumption for which both are taken to task. 
Foucault is reproached for the “sexist focus in his work 
[that] cannot be solved simply by adding women to his 
analysis” and this exposes the need “to fundamentally 
reconsider the way in which his focus on men alone 
skews some of [his] insights,” a need queer theory also 
frequently ignores (Mills 2003, 7). For similar sorts of 
reasons, queer theory is said by David M. Halperin and 
Valerie Traub (2009) to “despecify the lesbian, gay, bi-
sexual, trangender or transgressive content of queer-
ness, thereby abstracting ‘queer’ and turning it into a 
generic badge of subversiveness, a more trendy, non-
normative version of ‘liberal’ or ‘oppositional’” practice 
(17); this observation also has implications for queer-
ness as an unconscious mode of whiteness. Indeed, 
there is some “alarm over queer theory’s wholesale 
transition from gender to sexuality as the proper object 
of its analysis,” as Perez (2005) has noted while draw-
ing on Judith Butler, because queer theory’s increasing 
neglect of women and gender is not irrelevant to its ne-
glect of race and vice versa (173). In part, these effects 
are due to the ways Foucault’s theories, as queer theo-
ries, have almost completely enframed contemporary 
queer thought and being.
 Another problem queer non-identity politics 
obfuscates is its role in the maintenance of whiteness 
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as a pre-condition for subject effacement: it entails a 
de facto colour-blind liberalism or racism. On the one 
hand, “‘queering’ … is both a protest against foreclo-
sure of possible inclusion and a demand that the liberal 
(white, yuppified, Western) gay and lesbian establish-
ment recognize the ‘subalterns’ in its midst” (Hawley 
2001, 6). On the other, it “colludes with institutionalized 
racism in vanishing, hence retrenching, white privilege” 
simply because it “has exchanged too hastily the poli-
tics of identity for the politics of difference” (Perez 2005, 
187). Like Foucault, “‘[q]ueer theory’ has promised to 
complicate assumptions about routes of identification 
and desire” (Butler and Martin 1994, 3). In practice, 
however, the idea that queerness presents those who 
enter its spaces with the same opportunity for “limit-
less anonymous encounters” and subject effacement, 
belies a liberal, colour-blind assumption that people 
who enter queer spaces are equally welcomed, desired, 
and entitled to act on desire: this is the paradoxical, in-
visible foundation of queerness—it too readily refus-
es interruptions of whiteness at the same time that it 
opens onto the possibility of (white) sexual de-subjec-
tification. Where queer anti-identity politics may afford 
white queers an opportunity at effacement, it may not 
so readily do so for queers of colour when whiteness 
dominates queer space. And in unique instances where 
queer space is not predominantly white, but racialized, 
it can still fail to do so for Indigenous queers, because 
queer spaces are just as likely to be dominated by the 
broad unconsciousness of settlers. As Andrea Smith 
(2011) argues, what can also “disappear within queer 
theory’s subjectless critique [is] settler colonialism and 
the ongoing genocide of Native peoples … queer theory 
(even queer of color critique), then, rests on the pre-
sumption of the U.S. settler colonial state” (47). 
 Sara Ahmed (2010) writes that “[y]ou learn to 
see yourself as you are seen by those who can inhabit 
the familiar, because they can recede into its form” (86). 
Where the queer familiar is white and/or settled, queers 
who are of colour or Indigenous are less likely to be seen 
or allowed to see themselves as equally susceptible to 
the infinite possibility of self; their difference as racial-
ized and Indigenous subjects in a queer, white, and set-
tled familiar will not be read or operate as non-identity, 
because racialized and Indigenous queerness is visibly 
qualified in ways that queerness unqualified (i.e., as in-
visible whiteness) is not. In other words, the queer con-
demnation of visibility politics fails to recognize that 
invisibility politics is still a privilege afforded primarily 
to white queers.
 Let’s assume that Foucault and queer theory’s 
failures to combat the largely male, white, and set-
tler queer unconscious is not an essential outcome of 
non-identity politics: does this allow us to better justi-
fy the rejection of identity politics? The answer to this 
question requires a return to Foucault. He recognized 
the aftermath of each exposure to the infinite possibility 
of self is that every exposure also leaves an identifiable 
mark. So, regardless of context, even new experienc-
es mark the mind and body; experience becomes new 
knowledge that is yet to be effaced by another moment 
in between the experience you knew and the experience 
you will know. This suggests that queer contexts, as sites 
for initiating subject effacing resistances, entail no more 
or less possibility than other contexts. At best, they al-
low for the idea that queer virtualities are singular (or 
at least one of a very few) sites in which experiences of 
desexualization are possible, but not the broader con-
clusion that they are the only sites for any and all expe-
riences of desubjectification, which might also explain 
how queerness can fail to interrupt the unconsciousness 
of whiteness, sex, gender, and the settler. Queer sites are 
like all sites, in that no matter your experience, they too 
are quick to restrain experience as knowledge; there-
fore, the pursuit of experience over identity, however it 
is proposed by queer theory, does not necessarily offer 
more opportunity for resistance. 
 When conjoined with the idea that all contexts 
can present the possibility of subject-effacement, the 
strategic utility of being a self-identified “queer” chal-
lenges the assumption that queer contexts are singular 
sites through which to “re-open affective and relational 
virtualities” (Foucault 1989, 207). To be clear, the prob-
lem with this assumption is simply that it marginalizes 
the political aims of desubjectification to a single con-
text, one that is framed, ordered, and regulated by rules 
akin to a “queer” subject position, even as the inhabi-
tants of queer space may wish or claim to reject identi-
ty.30
 This raises two final questions: is self-effacement 
really dependent on never naming your self in relation 
to your practices, and is effacement possible if it is re-
peatedly pursued in one as opposed to many subjects’ 
contexts? 
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 Insofar as it is true that “gay” identity is as con-
straining as heterosexual identity, the idea that constraint 
is enough of a reason to utterly reject identity overlooks 
how assertive “out” or visible gay, lesbian, trans, or 
queer subjects also facilitate subject-effacement. For in-
stance, consider that the effacing “desire-in-uneasiness” 
of the “heterosexual” can be initiated when she is faced 
with her own difference and similarity as a “queer” that 
is also manifested as human being (Foucault 1989, 207). 
Where the “heterosexual” encounters queer subjects, 
the self parading as a “heterosexual” can exceed the con-
fines of heterosexual knowledge that otherwise obfus-
cates her infinite possibility. The self can free itself from 
heterosexual knowledge if and when it understands 
that selves, albeit other selves, exist in relation to other 
knowledges, such as queerness. The simple juxtaposi-
tion of the “queer” against the “heterosexual” is enough 
to convey to a self its possibility to know itself in a man-
ner that is new and unlike its present self-knowledge. 
Of course, if the “queer” is going to successfully chal-
lenge “heterosexual” self-knowledge, the willingness on 
the part of the “heterosexual” to attempt to understand 
other-subjects is paramount. Luckily, many different 
subjects, moved by self, are willing to understand oth-
er-subjects. 
 To clarify the possibility of the other-subject as 
a means of effacement, consider this anecdote. A for-
mer coworker once told me that, although he did “not 
want to understand” my queerness, he “liked me any-
way.” Struck by his choice of words, I asked, “Do you 
mean you don’t understand or you don’t want to under-
stand?” Indeed, he said he did not want to understand 
queerness. What is interesting about this exchange is 
how conscious and determined he was about not un-
derstanding queerness. The question is why, why was 
he so extremely uncomfortable with the idea of under-
standing me as a “queer?” Perhaps the answer is that 
he knew all too well that to understand a queer subject 
might mean he would have to face his own infinite pos-
sibility insofar as the one thing that is recognizable be-
tween other-subjects is self. In effect, the other-subject 
is also a self. Thus, if my coworker were to recognize the 
self in the other-subject that is me, he might also realize 
that his self is not necessarily constrained by his current 
relation and commitment to heterosexual knowledge. 
In other words, to acknowledge that a self is what oth-
er-subjects do have in common is to acknowledge that 
one’s self can or could be that other-subject; the self, like 
the self of the other-subject, can also partake in new, 
albeit limited and determined, possibilities that are re-
alised through the grasp of the knowledge of any oth-
er-subject the self wills itself to understand. Perhaps this 
is precisely why my coworker refused to understand me 
as a “queer.” 
 To clarify, I am not suggesting my former co-
worker is or is not a latent queer. I am suggesting he 
is aware that the act of understanding an other-subject 
that is queer poses a threat to his own heterosexual sub-
jectivity: effacement can be the result of the juxtaposi-
tion of subjected-self to other-subject. The possibility 
of effacement in this instance, however, will only occur 
when one subject is faced with a contrary and self-af-
firmed identity (i.e., “I am queer”). Without the con-
trariness of other-subjects, therefore, too many subjects 
have no opportunity to brush up against the self ’s pos-
sibility insofar as it is clearly reflected in the (re)presence 
of other-subjects. So even as Foucault and queer theory 
may locate effacement in practices of non-identity, there 
are instances wherein the willingness of a subjected-self 
to comprehend an other-subject serves powerfully to 
illustrate the self ’s possibility to itself, and even if that 
possibility appears to be finite or restricted to a few new 
subject positions. Perhaps a willingness to comprehend 
the infinite possibility of one’s own self is dependent, at 
least initially, upon the contradistinction between sub-
jected-self and other-subject. For example, maybe the 
self must encounter other-subjects as other possibilities 
concerning the self-subject relationship, however finite 
and constraining those other-subject positions are, be-
fore the self can even pursue effacement. 
 This paper does not question the significance of 
Foucault and queer theory as inducements to explore 
the infinite possibility of self or the value of non-iden-
tity politics. What it does question are the implications 
of a queer practice of invisibility that utterly rejects 
identity politics. It has expounded on the political dan-
gers of an uncritical practice that never dares to say “I 
am,” although it accepts the political possibility and 
resistance to which a practice of refusal can give rise, 
even if only in some contexts. It asserts that the balance 
between risk and possibility is best achieved when the 
politics of subject-effacement or non-identity is treated 
as one mode of resistance that is inter-dependent with 
the resistance elicited by a politics of visibility; both are 
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distinct modes that can realize resistance in different 
contexts. Its final contention is that the queer politics 
of non-identity resists the constraints of sexual subjec-
tivity in queer space and time. Whereas the politics of 
identity shakes the foundations of whiteness and het-
eronormativity, as well as white homonormativity, not 
only within the latter’s field of operation, but in intrepid 
ways that are impossible for non-identity.
Endnotes
1 For the original interview, see Joecker, Oerd, and Sanzio 1982. 
2 Barbara Ryan (2001) encapsulates the fundamental divide be-
tween identity politics and queer theory: “[q]ueer theory is a re-
bellion from separatism because it calls into question all categories 
upon which conventional notions of identity rely. It is opposed to 
identity politics ‘as a form of expressive pluralism where identity 
is reified—that is, understood to be represented in a self-evident 
and authentic way through one’s body—and collectivity is reduced 
to group affiliation defined according to the standard of authentic 
embodiment’” or essentialism. She goes on to say that, “[i]dentity 
politics assumes a conforming identity, and queer theory explicit-
ly critiques normativity, monolithic identities, and assimilationist 
policies…, ‘queer’ is used to signify diverse inclusive politics within 
the gay and lesbian community” (325-26). 
 Richard Thomson Ford (2007) also clarifies queer an-
ti-identitarianism as a response to the essentialist constraints of 
identity politics; he writes that “queer denotes not an identity but 
instead a political and existential stance, an ideological commit-
ment, a decision to live outside some social norm or other. At the 
risk (the certainty) of oversimplification, one could say that even 
if one is born straight or gay, one must decide to be queer” (479). 
He further argues that “[q]ueer theory’s anti-identitarianism is key 
to its portability…” in that “the queer critique of (nominally) gay 
identity politics would seem to apply to identity politics general-
ly” (479). To illustrate his point, Ford explains that this element of 
portability, which enables queer theory to be applied as critique in 
relation to any identity politics, was instrumental in relation to his 
(prior) book Racial Culture, in which “[q]ueer theory’s destabiliz-
ing agenda offered [him] a way to resist the super-sizing of identity 
politics at a moment when it seemed at its most preeminent”; it al-
lowed him to “advance[d] an attack from the Left on racial identity 
politics in legal theory” (481) and it “not only offered a new the-
oretical frame within which to understand and analyze the often 
severely coercive aspects of Left liberal racial identity politics…, 
it also offered an alternative attitude, tone, or ‘stance’ to occupy in 
relation to it” (482).
 Conversely, there are many “commonly voiced anxiet-
ies” that surround queer too, ones that pertain to: “whether a ge-
neric masculinity may be reinstalled at the heart of an ostensibly 
gender-neutral queer; whether queer’s transcendent disregard for 
dominant systems of gender fails to consider the material condi-
tions of the west in the late twentieth century; whether queer sim-
ply replicates, with a kind of historical amnesia, the stances and 
demands of an earlier gay liberation; and whether, because its con-
stituency is almost unlimited, queer includes identificatory catego-
ries whose politics are less progressive than those of the lesbian and 
gay populations with which they are aligned” (Jagose 1996, n.p.). 
Like Jasbir K. Puar, postcolonial theorists, such as José Esteban 
Muñoz (2009), speak further to these anxieties because of prom-
ises broken by “white neoliberal queers who studiously avoid the 
question of ethnic, racial, class, ability, or gender difference” (31), 
an avoidance that may or may not suggest queer theory per se (i.e., 
as opposed to the queer’s that apply it) is as portable as Ford argues. 
3 Presentment is a continental philosophical notion that funda-
mentally conveys what is at issue in relation to temporal-ontologi-
cal questions of identity as essence, or as that which is stable, uni-
fied, coherent, and authentic. As Calvin O. Schrag (2004) explains, 
“[t]heories of meaning based on a doctrine of essence make pur-
chases on the universalizability of meaning through a procedure 
of representation. A doctrine of essence travels hand in glove with 
a claim that a meaning that was present in a given context can be 
re-presented in another context. But that which remains problem-
atic in such a putative state of affairs is not only the possibility of 
retrieving or repeating a presentation that is no longer present in 
its presentational immediacy, but indeed the sense of what it means 
to experience ‘presence’ in its alleged original presentment” (4).
4 Halberstam’s discussion is not focused particularly on assemblag-
es so much as it relies on the concept to analytically characterize 
animated characters in contemporary children’s film; although “Ju-
dith” is cited as Halberstam’s first name in The Queer Art of Failure 
(2011), Halberstam (2012) has since changed it to Jack and indicat-
ed on his website that he is inclined toward a “floating pronoun” for 
a number of reasons: “first, I have not transitioned in any formal 
sense and there [sic] certainly many differences between my gen-
der and those of transgender men on hormones. Second, the back 
and forth between he and she sort of captures the form that my 
gender takes nowadays. Not that I am often an unambiguous “she” 
but nor am I often an unambiguous he. Third, I think my floating 
gender pronouns capture well the refusal to resolve my gender am-
biguity that has become a kind of identity for me” (n.p.). 
5 In many respects, it is also a response to what it fears is the mono-
lithic influence of Judith Butler and performativity—it intends to 
shift the Butlerian paradigm that it suspects has dominated queer 
theory for too long now (Nigianni and Storr 2009, 2). 
6 Although Shildrick (2009) makes this observation in a discussion 
that focuses on disabled bodies, queer theory, and Deleuze, it is 
pertinent to queer theory, broadly speaking, as theory that targets 
or resists the politics of social exclusion; Shildrick also observes 
that this creates a “conundrum” for queer theorists “willing to de-
ploy a Deleuzean rather than more generalised queer approach to 
the problematic of bodies that matter” or don’t matter, because so-
cial exclusions are central to this problematic (129).
7 Puar (2011) also appears to acknowledge something like this 
insight insofar as newer work explores “becoming-intersectional 
assemblage[s]” (n.p.); her return to “intersectionality,” which signi-
fies identity politics to an important degree, suggests her position 
may have shifted somewhat since the publication of her book Ter-
rorist Assemblages (2007).
8 In part, Cohen and Ramlow’s (2005/2006) article is a genealogy 
of Deleuze and Guattari’s (invisible) influence in queer theory from 
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its inception. They read, and reread, Deleuze and Guattari into 
some of queer theories’ early texts, even as the theorists respon-
sible for them are obvious Foucauldians, such as David Halperin 
and Michael Warner. In a footnote, they go so far as to suggest that 
Halperin’s Saint Foucault: Towards a Gay Hagiography “seem[s] 
to us to deploy (whether wittingly or not) a specifically deleuzo-
guattarian molecular politics in the elaboration of queer theory” 
(n.13). Although they were friends, and in active philosophical 
dialogue between 1962 and 1977, at which point “the dialogue is 
interrupted” and “Foucault will never see Deleuze again” (Ewald 
n.d., n.p.), the fact that Deleuze can be read into queer analyses that 
are manifestly Foucauldian with such ease, I think, speaks less to 
the idea that Deleuze’s influence within the context of queer theory, 
as opposed to other contexts, is contemporaneous with Foucault’s. 
Instead, it belies the fact that Foucault and Deleuze really do share 
very similar perspectives on human being, desire and the problem 
of identity, even as they fundamentally diverge on very important 
questions about the nature and relationships of ontology and dis-
course. Thus, if one were to perform a genealogy of the witting-be-
coming-Deleuze of queer theory, if you will, it is probably more 
accurate to locate the onset of his influence, in the sense of a trend, 
in the early to mid-2000s, which is not to say that no queer theo-
rists ever work with his ideas prior to this. 
9 The origin of queer theory is often associated with the works of 
Judith Butler, but Foucault’s role in its initiation and his influence 
in the emergent field are undeniably prior to Butler’s work.
10 Due to the limits of space, this discussion of identity politics pro-
vides only a context to clarify how and why Foucault’s theories ul-
timately treated identity as something that is at odds with politics 
and resistance. 
11 Barbara Smith was also a founding member of the Combahee 
River Collective.
12 As Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic (2012) note, the radical 
politics of the civil rights movement drew the insights of figures, 
such as “Sojourner Truth, Frederick Douglas, W. E. Du Bois, César 
Chávez, Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Black Power and Chicano 
movements” (5).
13 Diana Fuss (1989) astutely observes that there is “a tendency in 
current theory to conflate ‘identity’ with ‘essence’ as if they were 
mirror images of each other,” a tendency that is misguided because 
it ignores the fact that “identity, of course, has a philosophical and 
intellectual history of its own, which though it frequently dovetails 
with the history of the Western understanding of essence, none-
theless just as frequently trajects in quite different directions” (98). 
Although Fuss wrote this in 1989, this uncritical belief, arguably, is 
as or more widely held than it was before.
14 Collin Davis (2004) clarifies a nuanced difference between post-
structuralism and queer and postcolonial perspectives on the ques-
tion of identity. He writes, “[w]hereas poststructuralism broadly 
rejects stable identities, subject areas such as queer theory and post-
colonial studies respond to the fact that in many circumstances we 
do identify ourselves as situated, embodied, gendered, sexual, and 
racial beings. This is not necessarily in blunt denial of poststruc-
turalism, even if it is sometimes presented and perceived as such” 
(169). It is not a denial, because these perspectives agree that the 
subject, and thus the identities to which it may give rise, are ines-
sential, constructed, or discursive formations. On another note, cri-
tique surrounding identity politics as essentialism has implications 
for feminist epistemologies too. The necessary link between identi-
ty and politics implies a necessary link between identity and access 
to knowledge (i.e., the identification of social and political truth, 
epistemological authority, and voice as each relates to questions of 
sex, race, class, sexuality, and so on); this speaks also to the problem 
of identity politics as a foundation for unifying a movement.
15 Harris (1999) identifies Valdes as one of the most significant 
LaCrit theorists of the 1990s; Valdes is also influential in the con-
text of queer legal studies.
16 Harris (1999) suggests an over-emphasis on “intellectual work” at 
the expense of sustained “internal community building and main-
tenance” is also part of the problem (314).
17 David Halperin (1995) claims Foucault used “homosexual” stra-
tegically as “an identity without essence” because of the opposing 
opportunity it created to resist heterosexuality (61). However, 
when Foucault discusses the historically opportune position the 
homosexual occupies, he does not identify as “homosexual” and 
refers only to “the homosexual” when engaged in interviews on this 
topic. As a result, he maintains a personal distance between him-
self and the identity category “homosexual” (Halperin, 61); see also 
Foucault Live, particularly interviews 17,18, 20, and 24 (Foucault 
1989).
18 According to James Miller’s (1993) biography, Foucault first came 
upon the idea of “systematically effacing…subjectivity” in Hegel’s 
works, but later found it was also central in Heidegger’s and Ni-
etzsche’s thought (41).
19 To enact this idea, and the critical ontological question behind 
it—“what difference does it make who is speaking?”—Foucault 
chose to be interviewed anonymously by Le Monde on the topic of 
the “author” (Foucault 1984, 120; 1989, 192); Le Monde is a French 
daily evening newspaper. He did so to address the violent paradox 
of the “author’s” visibility as such. He contends that the famous “au-
thor” acquires power through visibility in that he enjoys social po-
sition and fortune, and yet this visibility also thwarts his power; the 
“author’s” success erases the unique power and possibility of a “time 
when, being completely unknown, what [he] said had some chance 
of being heard” (1989, 193). Foucault’s point is that the knowledge 
of who is speaking or writing becomes the lens through which sub-
sequent speech, works, and acts are known—new speech, works 
and acts are known only as echoes of those prior and, thus, the self 
is never heard again. This is why Foucault’s anonymous interviews 
(he also wrote anonymous articles) are tantamount to his refusal 
to say “I am ‘gay’.” His use of anonymity is akin to his refusal to 
identify as gay. Foucault intends both moves to thwart the trap of 
being known.
20 Subject effacement resists a will to knowledge, which is not en-
tirely unlike the “‘[w]ill to truth’” that Nietzsche (1954) argues is an 
uninterrupted echo of an “ancient will to power”—it is akin to Ni-
etzsche’s will to power, wherein, the self that would ward off the ego 
is “that which must always overcome itself” (225). For Nietzsche and 
Foucault, the potency of echoes (as a will to power or will to knowl-
edge) is their presence as “mob” or discursive knowledge respec-
tively; both persuade the self to enact only one possibility among 
many, and one that is a particular ego or subject (Nietzsche 1954, 
480). This is at the core of the Nietzschean and, ultimately, Fou-
cauldian awareness that “[w]hatever I create and however much I 
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love it—soon I must oppose it and my love” in that it reflects the 
intensity of the resistance the self must exercise if it is to resist the 
advances made upon it by the ego or the subject (227).
21 For Nietzsche, this repeated transcendent movement is the eter-
nal return; unlike Nietzsche, Foucault rejects any idea of “transcen-
dence” because it implies a “residuum” of ontology, wherein a tran-
scendent self reflects a structuralist or universal sense of self. This 
rejection was also a reaction to the thought of existentialist philos-
ophers such as de Beauvoir and Sartre who characterized freedom 
as a kind of transcendence of the subject (Foucault 1989, 79).
22 A marginal knowledge of sensation that permanently replaces a 
dominant one still serves subject formation, albeit a marginal or 
new subject.
23 The idea of reclaimed meaning or terminology is at the heart of 
Foucault’s notion of “‘reverse’ discourse” (Foucault 1980, 101). It is 
also noteworthy that Foucault would not necessarily be against the 
content of all gay rights, although he would not be willing to affirm 
an identity in order to get them.
24 Although Lisa Duggan is attributed with coining the term 
“homonormativity,” Susan Stryker (2008) argues there is “an older 
formulation of homonormativity,” one which was in use in the con-
text of transgender theory, particularly, (Judith) Jack Halberstam’s 
work in the 1990s. This formulation occurs before Duggan takes it 
up as an aspect of neoliberalism (145).
25 Another interpretation of these striking parallels is that Puar’s 
political project is more Foucauldian than it is Deleuzian, as Ter-
ry Goldie (2010) observes: “the politics of the book [Terrorist As-
semblages] are more informed by Foucault’s theories of power and 
knowledge, but the mode of the book is Deleuzian”—it is Deleuz-
ian only in rhetorical style and flourish (n.p.). Either way, Foucault, 
Deleuze, and Puar are alike in their suspicion of identity.
26 Foucault (1984) rejects the use of biography as evidence for or 
against theory insofar as doing so illustrates something like the de-
mand that the “author,” as such, not only reiterate, but embody “the 
principle of a certain unity of writing” (111; Eribon 1991, 26). The 
documentary Michel Foucault: Beyond Good and Evil (1993) also 
details the razor blade incident.
27 Miller (1993) writes that, “Foucault was understandably wary 
about becoming too closely linked in the popular mind with gay 
subculture he was part of ” (256). 
28 Gayatri Spivak (1988), the postcolonial feminist, proposed one 
of the earliest versions of this idea wherein she characterizes one 
“effect of the subject as subaltern…as the strategic use of a posi-
tivist essentialism in a scrupulously visible political interest,” also 
referred to as “strategic essentialism” (205). Spivak would later re-
consider the political worth of this idea and retract it. The problem, 
however, is not the strategy, but the essentialism that typically and 
uncritically is conflated with contemporary notions of identity and, 
therefore, any strategic use of it. The idea that identity has not al-
ways been understood to entail and, therefore, need not always and 
only be reduced to essentialism is an insight that I think Diana Fuss 
(1989) gets right.
29 During a discussion of Michael Warner’s The Trouble with Nor-
mal (1999), an undergraduate in one of my classes, Rebekka Zol-
nierczyk, humourously characterized this as a “queerer than thou” 
attitude that circulates within many queer spaces to keep other 
queers in line. 
30 The problem with this wish is that it cannot combat the fact that 
some compulsory identification always results from the self ’s per-
sonally unnamed practices that, nonetheless, are or will be named 
socially. I cannot repeatedly engage in queer sex and not be “queer,” 
even if I refuse the identity, because my practices ensure I will be 
known, at least by one or more people with whom I practice, as 
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